We present numerical simulations measuring secrecy and efficiency rate of Perfect Secrecy protocol based on Deep Random assumption presented in former article [9] . Those simulations specifically measure the respective error rates of both legitimate partner and eavesdropper experimented during the exchange of a data flow through the protocol. The measurements of the error rates also enable us to estimate a lower bound of the Cryptologic Limit introduced in [9] . We discuss the variation of the protocol's parameters and their impact on the measured performance.
Back on the Deep random assumption
We have introduced in [9] the Deep Random assumption, based on Prior Probability theory as developed by Good [12] , Carnap [11] and Jaynes [7] . Deep Random assumption is an objective principle to assign probability, compatible with the symmetry principle proposed by Jaynes [7] .
Let be a random variable with values in a set , having unknown (or hidden) probability distribution for an opponent eavesdropper , except a same public characteristical information . We denote the set of all such distributions. Let also be a random variable with values in a set , and whose probability distribution is known and depends from a parameter in set , that is typically the output value of an experiment of . If there exists a finite or isometric group of transformation such that, for each transformation , the distribution has no a priori reason for the opponent to be more likely than , (this in particular means that is stable by action of ) then, from the non-subjectivity principle, the set of possible joint distributions viewed from the opponent, can be restricted to the invariant class by action of :
and the Deep Random assumption states that the conditional expectation [ | ] can be restricted to :
(where designates any application from in an Hilbert space ).
The security model
We considered in [9] Autonomous Entities (AE), which, like in every classical protocol modelization, are entities capable to Generate random bit strings, Publish bit strings on the public channel, Read bit strings published by other AE from the public channel, Store bit strings, Make calculation on bit strings. The main difference of our model is that random generation also includes Deep Random generation, a form of randomness in which the probability distribution used by an AE is made unknown for all other party by the use of a Deep Random Generator (DRG).
In our model, an observer (or opponent) AE called (or also denoted in the following) is supposed to have unlimited calculation and storage power, it is also supposed to have full access to the information published by the legitimate AE partners on the public channel, that is supposed to be perfectly accessible and equivalent for any playing party (legitimate partners and opponents). The considered opponent is passive.
The specificity of our model is that when desires to infer the secret information generated by partner 's DRG (or 's DRG) from a public information, it can only do it in respect of the Deep Random assumption presented above.
This assumption is fairly reasonable, as established by the Prior Probability theory, under the condition that the DRG can actually produce distributions that are undistinguishable and unpredictable among the set of distributions compliant with the public characteristical information . It is also easy to see that for any non-objective strategy to assign prior probabilities, a better objective strategy exists ; « better » being understood under the sense of quadratic optimization in the considered Hilbert space, where is evaluated.
The protocols that we consider obey the Kerckhoffs's principle by the fact that their specifications are entirely public. We can thus modelize the usage of such protocol in 2 phases:
Legitimate partners Opponent
The elaboration phase
The specification of the protocol are made public ( with notations below)
The opponent elaborates its « best » objective strategy, being a deterministic or probabilistic function taking as parameters the public information that are released during an instantiation ( with notations below)
The instantiation phase
The legitimate partners both calculate their estimation of the common secret information based on (i) their part of the secret information generated during an instantiation of the protocol plus (ii) the public information that are released during the instantiation ( and with notations below)
The Opponent calculates its estimation of the common secret information as the value of the strategy function with the released public information as parameters.
( with notations below)
Then, when we say that distributions and are undistinguishable and unpredictable among the set through Deep Randomness, we mean that they are undistinguishable and unpredictable among the set through Deep Randomness for the opponent at the elaboration phase.
Concepts of Perfect Secrecy Protocols (PSP)
A « Perfect Secrecy Protocol » (PSP) , is a protocol according to the general model presented below, in which the AE (resp. requests its Deep Random Generator (DRG) at a given moment to obtain an experiment (resp. ) of a random variable (resp. ) with hidden probability distribution ; (resp. publishes the set of information (resp. on the public channel along the protocol ; (resp. calculates its estimation of a joined secret information (resp. , with value in an Hilbert space, and the evesdropping opponent who has a full access to the public information, calculates its own estimation , also called strategy of the opponent.
In case of PSP, there must exist a finite or isometric group of transformation keeping stable, and such that, for each transformation , the joint distribution is, by construction of the Deep Random generation process, undistinguishable from by the opponent. And therefore, the set of possible joint distributions viewed from the opponent, can be restricted to the invariant class by action of :
From the Deep Random assumption, the set of optimal strategies for the opponent can be restricted to:
The set of all possible such groups for the considered protocol , is denoted .
Then, the protocol is a PSP if it verifies the following property :
In practice, one can obtain the property typically by deriving the information (resp. ) published by (resp. ) from a degradation of a secret information (resp. ), in a way that the only mean for the opponent to estimate say from the public information { } is to perform a bayesian inference from { }, which requires the knowledge of the probability distribution of . Degradation can be understood as degradation of the accuracy of the signal . Rigorous definition of Degradation is given in [14] .
Deep random generation
It may appear impossible at first sight to generate an unknowledgeable probability distribution from a deterministic computing resource. In fact it is not. The basic idea is to use infinite incrementing counters as primary source of entropy, and then to run across those counters one or several Cantor' style diagonal recursive constructing process, in which at each step , the generator picks (through classical randomness) a new distribution that defeats the best possible strategy knowing all the past distributions for . Such a DRG, based on continuous and recursive contructing process, can only be designed in association with a given PSP. At each step , the generator emulates the PSP internally and picks (through classical randomness) a new couple of distributions that defeats the best possible strategy knowing all the past distributions for , which is always possible for a PSP thanks to property as shown in [9] .
In the present article, we will not focus on simulating a real DRG, but rather on simulating an example of PSP, introduced in [9] , working for the purpose of the simulation with a dummy emulated DRG.
Back on the presentation of protocol (introduced in [9])
The following PSP has been presented in [9] . In order to shortly remind the notations, the sample space of the distribution of the private information (for or ) is [ ] . Considering and some parameter vectors in [ ] and and some Bernoulli experiment vectors in { } , we denote :
(resp. ) the scalar product of and (resp. and )
In that protocol, besides being hidden to any third party (opponent or partner), the probability distribution used by each legitimate partner also needs to have specific properties in order to prevent the opponent to efficiently evaluate by using internal symmetry of the distribution.
Those specific properties are :
(i) Each probability distribution (for or ) must be « far » from its symmetric projection ̅ ∑
(ii) At least one of the distribution (of or ) must avoid to have brutal variations (Dirac)
The technical details explaining those constraints are presented in [9] . The set of compliant distributions is denoted where is a parameter that measures the « remoteness » of a distribution from its symmetric projection.
For such a distribution , a tidying permutation, denoted , is a specific permutation that enables to give a canonical form of , such form being useful to « synchronize » two distributions by transitivity. Again, technical details are given in [9] . One can just say here that it is linked to the quadratic matrix whose coefficient is
Here are the steps of the proposed protocol:
and are two AE, called the legitimate partners. The steps of the protocol are the followings:
Step Step 4 -Synchronization:
(resp. ) chooses randomly (resp. ) among (resp. ).
Step [4] .
The choices of the parameters are theoretically discussed in proof of main Theorem in [9] . They are discussed based on practicle simulations in the following section. They are set to make steps 5, 5' and 6 possible.
The Degradation transformations and with at step 2 are the ones that prevent the use of direct inference by the opponent, and of course, the Deep Random Generation at step 1 prevents the use of Bayesian inference based on the knowledge of the probability distribution. The synchronization step 4 is designed to overcome the independence between the choices of the distributions of and , and needs that the distributions to have special properties ( in order to efficiently play their role. It is efficient in ⁄ of cases (when picks and picks , which we will call favorable cases). And to prevent from gaining knowledge of , Dispersion step 3 mixes within with another permutation [ ] (and within with another permutation [ ]) that (1) is undistinguishable from knowing , and (2) manages to make the estimation of unefficient as shown in [9] . We denote the following set of strategies (invariant by transposition of or ( )):
} Because of Deep Random assumption over the group { } applied to the distribution of and , the strategy of the opponent can thus be restricted to .
is entirely determined by | | and a permutation, which explains the constraint and transformation applied on in step 3 to make
and [ ] indisguishable knowing (same with [ ], , and ).
The synchronization step has a cost when considering the favorable cases: knows that and are synchronized in favorable cases, which means in other words that knows that an optimal (or quasi optimal) permutation is applied to . This also means that in favorable cases, all happen like if when picks instead of , the result of the synchronization is that uses instead of . Starting from the most general strategy for , we also consider the following additional restrictions applicable to the favorable cases:
 Restriction to the strategies of the form , because [ ] [ ] depends only on and not on neither ,  And then restriction to the set of strategies such that , in other words strategies invariant by common permutation on . which leads to define the more restricted set of strategies:
The step 5 is called Decorrelation because at this step, thanks to the Deep Random Assumption, we have managed to create a protocol that can be equivalently modelized by a broadcast communication over 2 partially independent (not fully correlated) BSC, as shown in the main Theorem in [9] , and also that consequently, it is possible to apply error correcting techniques to create Advantage Distillation as established in [5] . This is a heuristic reasoning, and we must rather consider most general strategies and write the probability equations with the appropriate group transform, under Deep Random assumption, which is done in [9] . But this little array explains why we create partial independence between the BSC and consequently then an advantage for the legitimate partners compared to the opponent, bearing in mind that (resp. ) are absolutely undistinguishable knowing (resp. ), due to the fact that the distributions and (resp. and ) are unknown and thus also absolutely undistinguishable by .
The sampling method presented above has the drawback of the border effect. If the reference value is too close from one of the sampling frontier { √ } , then the sampling process becomes unefficient. In order to avoid the border effect, one can bring a little improvement to the protocol by allowing to publish :
and then to replace by √ in order to center within the sampling comb. This of course results in applying the same transform on and :
The publication of does not bring any additional information to the opponent regarding the valuable secret information being the parity of
The following section presents simulation and results confirming numerically that one can obtain strictly positive values of the Cryptologic Limit introduced in [9] with appropriate values of . The induced lower bound of the Cryptologic Limit is also measured.
II. Presentation of simulation and results

Handling dummy DRGs
In our simulation, we don't focus on DRG but specifically on the PSP presented in the previous section. The DRG of each partner is emulated from a fixed distribution in with .
is defined by :
Its quadratic matrix is:
And it verifies, still with notations of [9] :
Input parameters, dispersion and error correcting
The simulation is executed for a given set of parameters and, at each execution, it repeats times the protocol. In those simulations, we mainly focus on Advantage Distillation. The effect of Privacy Amplification will be discussed for one of the simulations. Information Reconciliation is not fully considered, but error correcting methods need to be handled at step 5' in order to achieve Advantage Distillation. We will use the (non-optimal) method proposed by Maurer in [5] ; the codewords chosen by can only be or depending on or . publicly discards all decoded sequence that is not or and obviously decodes accordingly if | | , and if | | .
The discarding rate is denoted , corresponding to the average ratio of discarded sequences.
Behavior of the opponent
The behavior of the opponent is tested with 3 canonical strategies among :
where is a permutation randomly chosen by among and is a permutation randomly chosen by among .
A pessimistic approach is adopted in which, the best of the three is selected for the opponent at the end of the execution of a simulation, separately for each measured criteria, when delivering the result (« best » meaning the one that gives the most favorable criteria for the opponent, typically the higher opponent's knowledge rate over the private information, or the lesser Cryptologic Limit).
Those three strategies are chosen on purpose:
 represents the only strategy that equalizes [9] section II for the details) ;  represents the canonical strategy beating the partners in case their distributions are not synchronized (e.g. which needs to avoid and ).  represents the canonical strategy when tries to « guess » and use the permutations and ; is efficient when guess correctly.
Output of simulation
Each execution of the simulation outputs 3 information:
(i) the error rate for the legitimate partners -denoted , (ii) the knowledge rate for the opponent -denoted , and (iii) a lower bound of Cryptologic Limit -denoted .
and | | can be seen respectively as the error rate and 'eavesdropping' rate, so both with values in [ ]. We decided in [9] , by convention that fits the common sense, that cannot be greater than ⁄ , and cannot be lower than ⁄ ; indeed, if ⁄ one can replace by ̅̅̅ (we then denote the final choice for ), and if ⁄ one can replace by ̅̅̅ (we then denote the final choice for ). And therefore, we can define as the net error rate, and as the net knowledge rate (by the opponent), with the following formulas:
(ii)
as introduced in [9] , represents the rate of perfectly reliable bit transmitted over the total amount of bit transmitted, which in the case of the protocol is :
(iii) (one can remark that it is possible to only transmit instead of , which can be coded with bits instead of ).
The simulation also uses the border effect improvement presented in section I, unless the opposite choice is explicitly mentioned in the condition of the simulation.
The 3 output information are measured as averaged over all the repetitions of the protocol within an execution of the simulation.
Presentation of the results
We have executed series of simulations with 3 dimensional coursing of parameters , and with being equal to at least 5,000.
The simulation program is written in C language, generated with Visual Studio 2015 on Windows 7 -64 bits. It uses the random generator RAND( ) of the stdlib.h standard library.
In the following results, the sampling parameter is expressed as a multiple of √ .
In all the graphics below, the abscissa represents the coursing parameter values, the left ordinate represents the values of error rate and knowledge rate , the right ordinate represents the values of the Cryptologic Limit's lower bound with value being multiple of , and the title of the graphic gives the values of the fixed parameters, and the range of the coursing parameter.
In the first graphic presented below, the values of the fixed parameters are , is coursing from to .
The maximum of is obtained for . As is increasing, the error rate is decreasing, and the knowledge rate is increasing, as expected.
The graphic below performs on the same parameters' values but without the border effect avoidance improvement. One can see that reaches a lesser maximum. Result delivery for n=10000, k=16, L=4, coursing sampling from 1 to 10 error rate knowledge rate
Crypto Limit
The second graphic below illustrates the use of a larger value for . One can see that it enables to reach a lower value of the error rate but the price to pay is a quicker increase of the knowledge rate, eventually resulting in a lower maximum of . Indeed, increasing too much results in lowering the sharpness of the synchronization process, and then favoring the efficiency of opponent's strategy .
The third graphic below represents the coursing of parameter when are fixed. It illustrates that, from a certain point, increasing has no positive effect on the outputs. The maximum of coincides with the optimal lowest value of the knowledge rate. The increase of has a strong effect on lowering the knowledge rate at the begining, but then, as already discussed, creates a back effect that lowers the efficiency of synchronization. The forth graphic below presents the effect of increasing the codelength . The fixed parameters are ; the codelength is coursing from to .
The maximum value for is rapidly obtained for . As expected when increases, the error rate decreases and knowledge increases.
The fifth graphic below presents a larger value of parameter . The other fixed parameters are . The learning from this graphic is that increasing the value of does not really help, even for the values of the error and knowledge rates, compared to the best results obtained with typically . It means that the internal parameters of the protocol are sufficient to create Advantage Distillation, but are not efficient enough to create strong Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification (IRPA). This suggests to add external sophisticated method for IRPA, as proposed in [4] and [13] to reach very low values of and acceptable for real implementation. We will discuss this in further work. Finally, in the sixth graphic, we present the effect of Privacy Amplification. We start from the result obtained in the fourth graphic for the highest value of , which gives the fixed parameters . We apply a simple Privacy Amplification method corresponding to the universal hashing function « multiply-add-shift » ( ) , for which parameters are picked for each new output digit (distilled from sequences of input digits). The codewords size varies from to :
The reduction of the knowledge rate is of course at cost of the increase of the error rate, and at the overall decrease of . It is stated however without proof that IRPA techniques are more efficient than increasing the value of .
As a main conclusion of this work, it is obtained that the Cryptologic Limit introduced in [9] can be approximately lower bounded by:
as per result of the fourth simulation (fourth graphic) presented above. That lower bound is absolutely not considered as optimal, and should be considered with the remarks that (i) we did not use real DRG but just emulations, (ii) we only considered the 3 strategies for the opponent. However, (i) the choice of appear as the most natural, and (ii) we gave an additional artificial advantage for the opponent by systematically choosing the best strategy among from the measures, which an actual opponent would not be able to do. Result delivery for n=10000, k=16, sampling=4, L=10, coursing PA from 1 to 30
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